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CASE NOTE 
Maslenjak v. United States: A concern about prosecutors’ 
limitless leverage regarding the international refugee policy  
 
Fengming Jin1 
I.  Introduction 
American citizenship has been long recognized as a 
“precious right,” and that [i]t would be difficult to exaggerate its 
value and importance.2 While many Americans are blessed with 
that right by virtue of their birth, many others have obtained it 
by virtue of naturalization. Throughout the American history, 
naturalized Americans have enriched all areas of the national life; 
business, government, law, science, sports, and the arts. A 
naturalized citizen is as much a citizen as any other: 
“[c]itizenship obtained through naturalization is not a second-
class citizenship.” 3  
Fifty-years ago, in the landmark case, Afroyim v. Rusk, the 
Court held that Fourteenth Amendment prevents Congress from 
taking away citizenship without the citizen’s assent.4 Regarding 
the holding, there is a critical exception in the regulation, which 
prohibits procured citizenship “contrary to law.” 5 In terms of 
the interpretation of “contrary to law,” 6 the circuit courts had 
split on the question of whether the false statement must be 
material to the granting of citizenship, under the circumstance 
which the predicate crime is a false statement to immigration 
officials. 7 
                                                        
1 Associate Member, 2018-2019 Immigration and Human Rights Law Review 
2 Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943). 
3 Knauer v. U.S., 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946). 
4 387 U.S. 253, 254, 87 S. Ct. 1660, 1661 (1967). 
5 18 U.S.C.§1425(a) (Lexis 2018). 
6 Id. 
7 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) (Lexis 2018) (prohibiting “knowingly mak[ing] any false 
statement under oath” in a naturalization proceeding). 
In the recent case, Maslenjak v. United States, 8  the 
Supreme Court resolved the circuit split, holding that if the 
underlying illegal act is a false statement to government officials, 
the government must show that the falsehood influenced the 
decision to grant citizenship.9  
This case note will first address those critical facts 
controlling the issue(s) in part II. Next, part III will introduce the 
Supreme Court’s holding on each relevant issue. Part III will 
discuss prior law, including a reading of the regulation10 and the 
circuit split prior to the case at hand. Moreover, part IV will 
describe and analyze the Supreme Court’s reasoning and 
decision. Lastly, part V will conclude this case note. 
II.  Facts 
Divna Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb, lived in Bosnia during its 
civil war in the 1990s.11 In 1998, she sought refugee status in 
the United States.12 Maslenjak stated under oath that her family 
faced persecution from both sides of the war: from Muslims, 
because of the family’s Serbian ethnicity, and from Serbs, 
because her husband had fled conscription in the Bosnian 
Serb Army.13 Based on her testimony, the family was granted 
refugee status.14 She was naturalized as a U.S. citizen.15 Six 
years after arriving in the United States, Maslenjak applied 
for naturalization.16 On the application form, Maslenjak marked 
“no” under oath to two questions asking whether she had ever 
lied to government officials during immigration proceedings.17 
                                                        
8 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).  
9 Id. at 1923. 
10 18 U.S.C.§1425(a). 
11 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1923.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1920. 
16 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1923.  
17 Id. 
She affirmed those responses under oath in a 
subsequent interview.18 
Soon after, the government found that Maslenjak had in 
fact made false statements.19 Immigration officials uncovered 
records showing that Maslenjak’s husband had been an officer 
in the Bosnian Serb Army and had served in a brigade involved 
in massacring approximately 8000 civilian Bosnian Muslims.20 
Within a year, he was convicted of making false statements on 
immigration documents.21 Maslenjak, testifying in an attempt to 
stop his deportation, admitted that she had been aware of his role 
in the war.22 
In response, the government charged Maslenjak with 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) by “knowingly ‘procur[ing]’” her 
naturalization “contrary to law.”23 The underlying illegality was 
making false statements under oath in a naturalization 
proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) — namely, the 
answers in her naturalization application and interview assuring 
her past honesty. 24  Despite an objection by Maslenjak, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
instructed the jury that any falsehood, regardless of whether it 
influenced the decision to grant naturalization, would suffice for 
a conviction.25 The jury found Maslenjak guilty, and the district 
court accordingly stripped her of citizenship.26 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s 
jury instructions. 27  According to the Sixth Circuit, the plain 
language of the statute and the overall statutory scheme of 
                                                        
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. Quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (2012). 
24 Id. at 1924. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 U.S. v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 686 (6th Cir. 2016). 
denaturalization did not compel a materiality requirement. 28 
Because making a false statement to immigration officials 
violated naturalization law, the court reasoned that the making 
of such a statement automatically constituted procuring 
citizenship “contrary to law” in violation of § 1425(a); 
regardless of whether the statement influenced the 
naturalization outcome.  
III.  Holding 
 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case, held 
that: (1) the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) -- which prohibits 
“procur[ing], contrary to law, the naturalization of any person” -
- makes clear that, to secure a conviction, the Federal 
Government must establish that the defendant’s illegal act 
played a role in her acquisition of citizenship; 29 (2) when the 
underlying illegality alleged in a Section 1425(a) prosecution is 
a false statement to government officials, a jury must decide 
whether the false statement so altered the naturalization process 
as to have influenced an award of citizenship; 30  and (3) 
measured against this analysis, the jury instructions in this case 
were in error, and the government’s assertion that any 
instructional error was harmless is left for resolution on 
remand.31 
IV.  Discussion of Prior Law 
Although the Constitution expressly authorizes Congress 
“to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,”32 it contains no 
corresponding general authority to strip Americans-either 
natural-born or naturalized-of their citizenship. That is no 
                                                        
28 Id. at 682–83. 
29 Maslenjak v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. at 1921 (2017). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1922 (2017). 
32 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 4. 
oversight: “in our country the people are sovereign, and the 
Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking 
away their relationship to the people by taking away their 
citizenship.” 33  Thus, as a general matter, the only way 
American citizenship can be lost is “by the voluntary 
renunciation or abandonment by the citizen himself.”34 There is 
but one exception to that rule: “naturalization unlawfully 
procured can be set aside.” 35 
 
A. The Federal Statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§1425(a); 1015 
(a); and 8 U.S.C. §1451(e). 
 
Section 1425(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code 
provides that a person: 
 
Whoever knowingly procures or attempts to 
procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of 
any person … Shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than [10 to 25 years], … 
or both.  
 
18 U.S.C.§1425(a). 
Upon a conviction, Section 1451(e) of Title 8 of the United 
States Code requires revocation of that person’s certificate of 
naturalization as provided in the Statute: 
 
When a person shall be convicted under section 
1425 of Title 18 of knowingly procuring 
naturalization in violation of law, the court in 
which such conviction is had shall thereupon 
revoke, set aside, and declare void the final order 
                                                        
33 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 267 n.23. 
admitting such person to citizenship, and shall 
declare the certificate of naturalization of such 
person to be canceled. 
 
8 U.S.C.§1451(e). 
One of the conducts “contrary to law”36 is “making false 
statements under oath,” as provided under 18 U.S.C. §1015(a): 
 
Whoever knowingly makes any false statement 
under oath, in any case, proceeding, or matter 
relating to, or under, or by virtue of any law of 
the United States relating to naturalization, 
citizenship, or registry of aliens … Shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. §1015(a).  
Due to widespread fraud and abuse in procurement of 
naturalization, Act of June 29, 1906, of which predecessor to 18 
U.S.C. §1425 was part, was passed as attempt to remedy and to 
prevent occurrence of fraud in naturalization proceedings.37 The 
Regulation provides the basis for the Government to strip the 
citizenship from a naturalized citizen if he/she procured the 
citizenship “contrary to law.” Further, under 8 U.S.C. §1451, it 
granted the Government the power to revoke naturalized 
citizenship if the citizenship was procured by fraud or illegally 
procured.38 An element of “materiality” is not mentioned in the 
plain language in Section 1451(e), however, it was required in 
the prior subsections of Section 1451.  
Under 18 U.S.C. §1015(a), a conviction under Section 
                                                        
36 18 U.S.C. §1425(a).  
37 See 18 U.S.C. §1425. 
38 See 8 U.S.C. §1451. 
1451(e) and Section 1425 (a) can be found for false swearing in 
naturalization proceedings. 39  Regarding the conviction, 
“materiality” was not an element of the crime of knowingly 
making false statement under oath in naturalization proceeding 
under the Regulation. However, “any false statement,” whether 
such false statement is material or immaterial, could satisfy the 
requirement by Section 1015(a).40 Therefore, under plain text of 
the Regulation, materiality of false statement is not an element 
of §1015(a).  
B. The circuit split on the Regulations 
Courts have grappled with delineating the precise contours 
of the window for denaturalization entitled by the Regulations. 
One area the jurisdiction is split on is delineating the question of 
whether a false statement must be material to the granting of 
citizenship, when the predicate crime is the false statement to 
immigration officials. For example, in some jurisdictions, any 
false statement, regardless of impact on the naturalization 
decision, justifies a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).41  
However, in other jurisdictions, to find a conviction under 
Section 1425(a), Courts require the fact in the false statement 
must have been material, and the naturalized citizen must have 
procured citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or 
concealment.42 The courts further advocates for a definition of 
materiality that is consistent with general legal usage: a material 
misrepresentation must have at least a natural tendency to 
produce the conclusion that the applicant was qualified for 
                                                        
39 See 18 U.S.C. §1015. 
40 Id. 
41 U.S. v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2016) . 
42 U.S. v. Munyenyezi, 781 F.3d 532, 534 (1st Cir. 2015); See also U.S. v. Alferahin, 
433 F.3d 1148, 1154–56 (9th Cit. 2006) (The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit holds that §1425(a) contains a materiality requirement); U.S. 
v. Aladekoba, 61 F. App’x 27, 28 (4th Cir. 2003). (Held that in order to convict 
under 18 U.S.C. §1425(a), …the statements must be material in order to be 
contrary to law). 
citizenship.43  
IV. Opinion Description and Analysis 
A. Reasoning by the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court resolved the jurisdiction split, vacated 
and remanded the case.44 Justice Kagan45 wrote for the Court, 
held that: the Government must establish that an illegal act by 
the defendant played some role in her acquisition of citizenship. 
46  When the illegal act is a false statement, that means 
demonstrating that the defendant lied about facts that would have 
mattered to an immigration official, because they would have 
justified denying naturalization or would predictably have led to 
other facts warranting that result.47  
The Supreme Court first took a close look at Section 
1425(a), and concluded that “to procure” something is “to get 
possession of” it, 48 and “procur[ing], contrary to law, 
naturalization” 49 meant obtaining citizenship illegally.50 The 
“most natural” reading of that phrase, in turn, was that “the 
illegal act must have somehow contributed to the obtaining of 
citizenship. 51  The Supreme Court suggested an example 
regarding this “most natural” reading of the phrase: consider if 
someone said to you: “John obtained that painting illegally.”52 
You might imagine that he stole it off the walls of a museum; or 
that he paid for it with a forged check.53 But in all events, you 
                                                        
43 U.S. v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d at 1151 (9th Cit. 2006).  
44 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1931. 
45 Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, 
joined the majority. 
46 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1923. 
47 Id. 
48 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1924. 
49 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (2012). 
50  Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1925. 
51 Id. at 1925. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
would imagine illegal acts in some kind of means-end relation—
or otherwise said, in some kind of causal relation—to the 
painting’s acquisition.54  
And the same goes for naturalization.55 If whatever illegal 
conduct occurring within the naturalization process was a causal 
dead-end, then the act cannot support a charge that the applicant 
obtained naturalization illegally.56  
The government’s argument to the contrary, the court 
observed, “falters on the way language naturally works.” 57 
Imagine, the court suggested, a scenario in which “an applicant 
for citizenship fills out the necessary paperwork in a government 
office with a knife tucked away in her handbag (but never 
mentioned or used).”58 Although the applicant has violated the 
law barring weapons in federal buildings, and “has surely done 
so in the course of procuring citizenship,”59 the court concluded, 
she has not obtained citizenship “contrary to law,”60 because the 
relationship between the violation of law and the acquisition of 
citizenship “are in that example merely coincidental: The one 
has no causal relation to the other.”61  
The Court was also concerned that a broad reading of the 
Regulation by the government would create a profound 
mismatch between the requirements for naturalization on the one 
hand and those for denaturalization on the other. 62  The 
immigration statute requires all applicants for citizenship to have 
“good moral character.”63 The Government argued, observed by 
the Court, that some legal violations that do not justify denying  
                                                        
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1926. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1926-1927. 
63 8 U.S.C. §§1427(a)(3), 1101(f). 
citizenship under that definition would nevertheless revoke    
it later.64 Regarding the argument made by the Government, the 
Court stated that the statute’s description of “good moral 
character” singles out a specific class of lies “false testimony for 
the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits” as a reason to 
deny naturalization.65 The rationale behind this reasoning by the 
Court, is that the Court concerned a broad reading of the Statute 
will open “the door to a world of disquieting consequences,”66 
in which a lie “would always provide a basis for rescinding 
citizenship,” 67  even if the lie merely resulted from 
“embarrassment, fear, or a desire for privacy.”68 Indeed, the 
Court suggested, the Government’s rule would give “prosecutors 
nearly limitless leverage”69 a concern for many justices in the 
recent relevant cases.70 
Therefore, the Court found that the general statutory 
context reinforced Maslenjak’s reading of § 1425(a)71 because 
the Government’s reading would create a “profound 
mismatch” between the requirements for naturalization on the 
one hand and those for denaturalization on the other. And this 
effect, coupled with the fact that many individuals may, for 
innocuous reasons, fail to be entirely truthful regarding 
inconsequential matters while navigating the citizenship 
process.72 The Court further found that Congress intended such 
severe consequences would require “far stronger textual support” 
than that provided in the statutory text of § 1425(a) which 
requires a causal relationship between the illegal act and the 
                                                        
64 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1926-1927. 
65 Id. at 1927. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See Bond v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014); Yates v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).  
71 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1926. 
72 Id. at 1927. 
procurement of citizenship.73 
Next, the Court took a close examination of a “more 
operational” question of how the causation requirement should 
apply in practice for prosecutions in which a false statement to 
government officials was the predicate illegal act.74 The Court 
held that the issue a jury must decide in a case like this one is 
“whether a false statement sufficiently altered those processes as 
to have influenced an award of citizenship.”75 
The Court articulated two means by which a false statement 
could have the required effect on the naturalization decision by 
adopting an objective approach. First, if the misrepresented facts 
themselves justified denying citizenship; and second, if the 
misrepresentation threw investigators off a trail that could have 
led to disqualifying facts.76  In the first scenario, “an obvious 
causal link” exists between the falsehood and the granting 
of citizenship. 77  In the second scenario, dubbed the 
“investigation-based theory,” the government can establish the 
requisite causal connection with a two-part showing.78 First, the 
government must show that the misrepresented fact was 
“sufficiently relevant” to a qualification for citizenship, such that 
an immigration official seeking evidence about naturalization 
criteria would have been prompted to engage in 
further investigation. 79  Next, the government must establish 
that the ensuing investigation “would predictably have disclosed” 
a dis-qualifying fact.80 Even if the government succeeds in this 
two-part showing, the defendant can overcome it by 
                                                        
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1928. 
76 Id. at 1928-1929. 
77 Id. at 1928. 
78 Id. at 1929. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. Quoting Kungys, 485 U.S. at 774. (This “demanding but still practicable” 
standard, id. at 1930, accounts for the difficulty of proving the path of a 
hypothetical investigation, as well as the fact that the defendant, rather than the 
government, would have caused that evidentiary difficulty. id. at 1929.) 
demonstrating that she is actually qualified for citizenship 
because it is a “complete defense.”81 
Applying this analysis, the Court found error in the district 
court’s jury instructions.82 Because the instructions stated that 
no causal link was necessary between Maslenjak’s false 
statements and the government’s decision to grant her 
naturalization, the jury did not make any of the required findings 
regarding causation.83 The Court vacated the judgment of the 
Sixth Circuit, remanded the question of whether Maslenjak’s 
misrepresentations would have affected the decision to grant her 
citizenship.84  
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in 
the judgment.85 He agreed with the Court’s reasoning that the 
statute’s plain text and structure required the government to 
establish causation as an element of a conviction 
under § 1425(a).86 However, He argued that the Court should 
have left to lower courts the task of fleshing out the precise 
causal relationship required between the illegality and the 
granting of citizenship.87 He also points out that the question 
presented and the briefing before the Court focused primarily on 
“whether the statute contains a materiality element, not on the 
contours of a causation requirement.”88  
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment. 89  From his 
perspective, while the majority viewed the statute’s plain text as 
containing a causation requirement, he eschewed that framing. 
Instead, Justice Alito reasoned that when the predicate crime is 
a false statement, the language of § 1425(a) contains an implied 
                                                        
81 Id. at 1930. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1930-1931. 
84 Id. at 1931. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1931-1932. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 1932. 
materiality element.90 In his view, the federal law under which 
Maslenjak was convicted does require her lie to have been 
material, but it “does not require proof that a false statement 
actually had some effect on the naturalization decision.”91 
 To be material, the false statement must have a “natural 
tendency to influence” the outcome of a naturalization 
decision.92 Understood in this way, Section 1425(a) does not 
require proof that a false statement actually had some effect on 
the naturalization decision. The operative statutory language-
“procure” naturalization “contrary to law”-imposes no such 
requirement.93 For example, Justice Alito suggested, eight co-
workers jointly buy two season tickets to see their favorite 
football team play.94 They all write their names on a piece of 
paper and place the slips in a hat to see who will get the tickets 
for the big game with their team’s traditional rival.95 One of the 
friends puts his name in twice, and his name is drawn.96 Under 
such circumstance, the guy “procured” the tickets “contrary to” 
the rules of the drawing even though he might have won if he 
had put his name in only once.97 
 
B. A 9-0 Decision: An Outcome Highly Driven by the 
Concern about Unbounded Prosecutorial Discretion by the 
Government. 
 
In regard of the holding of the instant case, §1425(a) 
requires a causal link between false statements and the decision 
to grant citizenship. In the majority’s opinion, the Court 
                                                        
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
expressed its concern about the unbounded prosecutorial 
discretion by the Government through a broad reading of the 
Statute. Therefore, the Court rejected a broad argument by the 
government that any lie told over the course of the naturalization 
process could be the basis for denaturalization. The holding in 
Maslenjak indicated the Court’s attempt to develop a coherent 
approach to interpreting statutes that raise prosecutorial 
discretion issues, over a potential incompatibility between the 
gravity of an offense and the attendant consequences.  
In the oral argument, Justices evinced hostility towards the 
Government’s broad reading.98 
Chief Justice Roberts stated that there was “certainly a 
problem of prosecutorial abuse” under the government’s reading, 
since “the government will have the opportunity to denaturalize 
anyone they want.” 99  As for testing the limits of the 
Government’s position, Chief Justice Roberts asked a question, 
in which 20 years after a person was naturalized as a citizen, 
whether the Government officials simply notify that person, that 
he is not an American citizen after all because of a minor 
criminal offense, even if there was no arrest, conducted by him 
20 years ago and forgot to disclose in his application form 
seeking American citizenship. 100  The Government lawyer 
persistently held an unyielding position that the Government 
may revoke the citizenship of Americans who made even trivial 
misstatements in their naturalization proceedings.101  
After the questions asked by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Kennedy also questioned the Government’s position. Justice 
Kennedy pointed out that the Government lawyer should arguing 
for what citizenship is and ought to mean, instead of demeaning 
                                                        
98 Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017) (No. 16-
309). 
99 Id. at 54. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 54-55. 
the priceless value of citizenship.102  
Justices Kagan and Sotomayor expressed doubts at the 
Government’s stance that even seemingly inconsequential lies, 
like those about one’s weights103 or a childhood nickname,104 
could be the basis for denaturalization. Justice Kanga and 
Sotomayor’s questions also indicated the Court’s concern, that 
if the Court takes the Government’s position, a lie would always 
provide a basis for rescinding citizenship, even if the lie merely 
resulted from “embarrassment, fear, or a desire for privacy.”105 
 Justice Breyer addressed that the Government’s reading 
“would throw into doubt the citizenship of vast percentages of 
all naturalized citizens.”106 Justice Ginsburg raised her doubt by 
asking maybe “a simple-minded question,” that “how can an 
immaterial statement procure naturalization?” 
It is not surprising, that the Court delivered its opinion, 
although having already decided that the plain text of the statute 
does not required a causal link between false statements and the 
granting of citizenship, the causal link should be required to find 
a conviction under Section 1425(a) by using the most natural 
reading of the Statute. The doubts raised by the Justices in the 
oral argument was apparent in the Court’s opinion.  
The Court addressed that the Government’s broad reading 
of the statute as opening the door to a world of disquieting 
consequences.107 For instance, the Court gave an example of a 
woman who, while applying for citizenship, failed to disclose 
membership in an online support group or a prior speeding 
violation, and a prosecutor could scour her paperwork and bring 
a §1425(a) charge on that  basis, even many years after she 
                                                        
102 Id. at 55. 
103 Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017) (No. 
16-309). 
104 Id. at 30-31. 
105 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1927. 
106 Id. at 32. 
107 Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1927. 
became a citizen.108 Permitting such prosecutions would give 
prosecutors nearly limitless leverage. Without an explicit, 
textual expression of congressional intent, such limitless 
leverage held by the Government could not be countenanced by 
the Court.109 The concern about prosecutorial discretion by the 
Government is hence a crucial indicator driving the Court’s 
opinion to reject the Government’s broad reading of the 
Statute.110  
Regarding the concern, the Court has already delivered a 
line of statutory interpretation cases in which the Court, 
concerned about the ever-expanding criminal code and the 
attendant shift of power into the hands of prosecutors, has 
spurned broad government readings of federal criminal statutes.  
For example, in Yates v. United States,111 a 2015 decision, 
the Court overturned the conviction of a fishing boat captain, 
who had thrown overboard undersized red grouper found on his 
vessel, for violating an obstruction of justice statute that 
prohibits destroying or altering “any record, document or 
tangible object.”112 The Court found that the law covered only 
physical items that held information, but not fish disposed of to 
frustrate an investigation.113 That conclusion drew a sharp retort 
from Justice Kagan in a dissenting opinion, who wrote that “a 
‘tangible object’ is an object that’s tangible.”114 This narrow 
interpretation of the obstruction law in the Yates decision 
required a majority of the Justices to ignore the obvious meaning 
of “tangible” to impose a limit on prosecutorial discretion. 
Accepting the government’s position would mean almost 
anything that someone changed or disposed of could result in an 
                                                        
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 See id. at 1931. 
111 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).  
112 Id. at 1079-1080. 
113 Id. at 1080. 
114 Id. at 1092. 
obstruction of justice charge, especially because the statute 
applies to conduct even when there is no pending investigation. 
Later, in McDonnell v. United States,115 decided in 2016, 
the Court unanimously overturned the conviction of former 
Virginia governor who had received over $100,000 in gifts from 
a friend interested in securing government support for a new 
dietary supplement. 116  The Justices concluded that merely 
“arranging a meeting, contacting another official or hosting an 
event” did not constitute an “official act” under federal bribery 
and unlawful gifts law.117 The court expressed concern that “we 
cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the 
government will use it responsibly.” 118  The narrower 
interpretation keeps prosecutors from using the statute to reach 
conduct many would consider to be a part of ordinary politics. 
On June 33, 2017, the Supreme Court announced its 
decision in the instant case, Maslenjak v. United States, 
overturning a conviction for unlawfully procuring citizenship by 
making a false statement on an application.119 
  The apprehension in these decisions is that the 
Government lawyer is essentially arguing that judges should not 
be too concerned about a broad interpretation of the law, because 
the Government can be trusted to bring only those cases that 
involve real misconduct and not mere technical violations. The 
problem with this approach is that it is often difficult to 
distinguish benign conduct that might be illegal under a broad 
interpretation of the law but should not be pursued from 
wrongdoing acts truly worthy of a criminal prosecution. The 
issue is especially pertinent when in some cases, the impact of 
simply filing criminal charges can be so significant and a “not 
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guilty” verdict does little to restore a reputation. Therefore, 
Maslenjak indicated the Court’s anxiety about such cases 
involving prosecutorial abuse. However, the reasoning in the 
instant case left some questions, which were also mentioned in 
the concurring opinions by the Justices. 
 
C. Materiality vs. Causation. 
 
In the Majority’s opinion, the Court is concerned about the 
Government’s broad reading of Section 1425(a) would create a 
“profound mismatch” between the requirements for 
naturalization on the one hand and those for denaturalization on 
the other. This mismatch could be more crucial when many 
individuals may, for innocuous reasons, fail to be entirely 
truthful regarding inconsequential matters while answering the 
questions to the Government officials.120 Therefore, the Court 
held § 1425(a) must require a causal relationship between the 
illegal act and the procurement of citizenship.121  
In the Briefs written by the parties, 122  the Petitioner 
arguing that a materially element is required by Section 1425(a) 
and Section 1015(a).123 Therefore, the Petitioner further arguing, 
that the Sixth Circuit misconstrued Section 1425(a) by 
upholding a conviction where the Government failed to prove a 
causal link between the predicate violation and the procurement 
of naturalization. 124  In response to that, the United States 
arguing that materiality is not an element of 18 U.S.C. 1425(a). 
125 The Government also arguing that the Petitioner’s claim that 
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materiality is an element of 18 U.S.C. 1015(a) is not properly 
before this Court and lacks merits in any event.126 If Congress 
had wanted a materiality requirement to apply to Section 1425(a), 
the Government suggests, it would have said so specifically – as 
it has done in other statutes, either by using the word “material” 
or by using other terms, such as “perjury,” that are “understood 
to include a materiality requirement.”127 But it didn’t do so here, 
the Government continues, which “provides compelling 
evidence that the statute does not require such proof.” 128 
Reading a “materiality” requirement into the law would also 
make it difficult to apply the law consistently, the Government 
adds, because Section 1425(a) is an “umbrella” statute that 
applies to anyone whose naturalization is obtained through 
methods that are “contrary to other laws.”129 The statute applies 
to a wide range of underlying offenses, some of which – such as 
making a false statement under oath with regard to a material 
fact – already require materiality, while others – such as bribing 
an immigration official – do not or cannot. 
The Petitioner sees this reasoning as a point in its favor.130 
She counters that the absence of the word “material” from 
Section 1425(a) is “particularly unilluminating,” precisely 
because it would not have made sense for Congress to include it 
when the statute “applies to any actions ‘contrary to law’ that 
procure naturalization, not just false statements that do so.”131 
The Petitioner’s interpretation of Section 1425(a) to 
include a materiality requirement is also more consistent, the 
party argues, with the civil statute that authorizes the government 
to revoke citizenship that was obtained through the 
“concealment of a material fact or a willful 
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misrepresentation.”132 It would be “anomalous,” it maintains, 
for Congress to “authorize denaturalization in a criminal 
proceeding but not a civil proceeding based on the very same 
statement.”133 
But the Government dismisses any alleged inconsistencies 
in the two statutes. First, it pointed out, that another part of the 
same civil statute allows citizenship to be revoked if it was 
“illegally procured” – a term that does not require materiality.134 
Second, the civil and criminal denaturalization statutes are not 
coextensive.135  
The Petitioner further argues that Section 1425(a) requires 
a causal connection between the false statements and efforts to 
obtain American citizenship.136 “It would be odd indeed,” the 
Petitioner reasons, “to say that a person procures (or attempts to 
procure) something contrary to law if the violation, in fact, has 
no effect on the proceeding.” For false statements, the Petitioner 
says, this means that the Government must show that the 
statement was material, because a statement that is not material 
“cannot ‘procure’ an official decision.”137 This interpretation is 
most consistent with common sense, the Petitioner suggests, 
because there is no reason “Congress would want to punish (with 
criminal fines and imprisonment of up to five years) conduct that 
has no tendency to influence official decision-making.”138 If 
anything, the Petitioner continues, “the natural assumption 
would be just the opposite: that Congress meant to reserve such 
heavy punishment for statements of consequence.”139 
As for the holding of the instant case, the Court did not 
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fully address whether the Regulations require a “materiality” 
element.140 Instead of this, the Court held that the Government 
must establish that an illegal act by the defendant played some 
role in her acquisition of citizenship.141 When the illegal act is a 
false statement, that means demonstrating that the defendant lied 
about facts that would have mattered to an immigration official, 
because they would have justified denying naturalization or 
would predictably have led to other facts warranting that 
result. 142  Although the Majority used “materiality” and 
“causation” as two inter-changeable terms in its reasoning, it 
held that there was no finding that the citizen's false statement in 
the naturalization process that she had made no false statements 
to the government was not shown to be causally connected to the 
decision to grant naturalization.143 
However, “materiality” and “causation” are two different 
legal standards. As mentioned in Justice Gorsuch’s concurring 
opinion, joined with Justice Thomas, although the practical test 
expressed in the Majority’s opinion is surely thoughtful and may 
prove entirely sound, the question presented before the Court 
should focus primarily on “whether the statute contains 
a materiality element, not on the contours of a causation 
requirement.” 144  The outcomes should be different if the 
Regulation requires “materiality” as an element instead of a pure 
causal link under some circumstances. 145  For example, as 
suggested by Justice Alito, eight co-workers jointly buy two 
season tickets to see their favorite football team play.146 They 
all write their names on a piece of paper and place the slips in a 
hat to see who will get the tickets for the big game with their 
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team’s traditional rival.147 One of the friends puts his name in 
twice, and his name is drawn.148 Under such circumstance, the 
guy “procured” the tickets “contrary to” the rules of the drawing 
even though he might have won if he had put his name in only 
once.149 
In Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion, he further stated 
that the lower courts have not had a chance to pass on any of 
these questions in the first instance illustrated by the Court.150 
The reality is that most cases cited by the Court “have [again] 
focused only on the materiality (not causation) question; none 
has tested the elaborate operational details advanced today.”151  
Regarding the complicated practical test designed by the 
Court in the instant case, Justice Gorsuch concerned about 
whether the Majority should step such far to bear the risk of 
yielding the insight of their “thoughtful colleagues on the district 
and circuit benches.”152 The Court was using the materiality and 
causation as two inter-changeable terms in its majority’s opinion. 
However, the Petitioner treated the two concepts separately in its 
arguments. For example, in the oral argument, the Petitioner 
started the argument by asking for a causal link between the false 
statement and the procuring of the citizenship. 153  Justice 
Kennedy asked the Petitioner attorney for whether the false 
statement made by the Petitioner is material. 154  Petitioner 
admitted material should be treated as an element, but whether 
the Petitioner’s false statement is material to procure the 
citizenship should be a question left to the jury.155  
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Such argument makes clear that materiality and causation 
are two different concepts in the context of Petitioner’s argument. 
It could also be indicated in the Brief of Petitioner. 156  The 
Petitioner attorney made two separated argument in the brief, 
asking for: (1) “Section 1425 requires a causal link between the 
predicate violation and the procurement of naturalization;” 157 
and (2) “Section 1015(a) requires proof of a materially false 
statement.” 158 There is no place in the brief for Government 
even mentioned an argument denying a causal link. The 
Government only argued the materiality is not an element 
required by either Section 1425(a) or Section 1015(a). 159 
However, the holding by the Majority found both materiality and 
causation as required by the Statutes.  
In Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, he repeated the 
standard of the materiality, a standard also mentioned by the 
Majority in its opinion, that is: a person violates the statute by 
procuring naturalization through an illegal false statement which 
has a “natural tendency to influence” the outcome—that is, the 
obtaining of naturalization.160 Understood in this way, Justice 
Alito further stated, that Section 1425(a) does not require proof 
that a false statement actually had some effect on the 
naturalization decision. 161  Because the operative statutory 
language-“procure” naturalization “contrary to law”-imposes no 
such requirement. 162  Justice Alito suggested an example, 
imagine, a runner who holds the world’s record in an event 
wants to make sure she wins the gold medal at the Olympics, so 
she takes a performance enhancing drug.163 She wins the race 
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but fails a drug test and is disqualified.164 The second-place time 
is slow, and sportswriters speculate that she would have won 
without taking the drug.165 But it would be entirely consistent 
with standard English usage for the race officials to say that she 
“procured” her first-place finish “contrary to” the governing 
rules.166 
In Justice Alito’s opinion, the example illustrates that the 
language of 18 U. S. C. §1425(a) does not require that an illegal 
false statement have a demonstrable effect on the naturalization 
decision.167 Instead, the statute applies when a person makes an 
illegal false statement to obtain naturalization, and that false 
statement is material to the outcome. There is no “indication that 
Congress meant to require more.”168 
In the two concurring opinions, “causation” puts a higher 
burden on the Government to prove the conviction than 
“materiality” did. It could be majority’s intent to step further to 
use a stronger standard to avoid the Government’s broad reading 
of the Statute raising the argument later, that “a defendant 
knowingly performs a substantial act that he or she thinks will 
procure naturalization, that is sufficient for conviction.”169 The 
Majority intentionally took a more clear approach to articulate a 
new test to avoid sentencing discretion granted by ambiguous 
statutes.   
V.  Conclusion 
This case is the result of the concern by the Court about a 
mismatch: one between the gravity of the offense and the 
severity of the consequences, due to the mandatory 
denaturalization upon conviction in the Statutes. Maslenjak, 
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particularly in the oral argument, the Justices indicated such 
concerns of growing anxiety about prosecutorial overreach in 
their reasoning. 
Moreover, by giving hypothetical cases, the Court 
addressing its concern about potential problematic reality, not 
referring to cases plainly arise from a mismatch between statute 
and defendant, but rather due to a potential incompatibility 
between the gravity of an offense and the consequences. The 
broad reading of the statute will likewise result naturalized 
citizen accused of immigration-related crimes. Namely, a minor 
lie would be met with the drastic punishment of denaturalization, 
without any opportunity for a mitigating exercise of the 
prosecution. The Court made a compromise of a wait-and-see 
approach, which might offer more insight to the Court by district 
and circuit courts, for the urgent need to articulate a clear 
approach for interpreting broadly worded criminal statutes.  
